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ARTICLE
THE REGRESSION OF “GOOD FAITH” IN
MARYLAND COMMERCIAL LAW
By: Lisa D. Sparks, Esq.*
“Good faith,” in the affirmative or as the absence of bad faith, has always
been a challenge to define and judge as a matter of conduct, motive, or both.
Different tests apply a subjective standard, an objective standard, or even a
combination of the two. Some parties may be held to different expectations
than others. This determination of good faith has always been fact-driven
and somewhat transcendental. Until recently, however, the question invoked
a construct of fairness, resting on a two-pronged metric, at least insofar as
several key titles of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code were
concerned. Since June 1, 2012, the various Maryland Uniform Commercial
Code definitions of good faith have been stripped to the bare, subjective
“honesty in fact.”1 The ramifications of this deviation from the Uniform Law
Commission’s2 promulgated Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) and
decades of jurisprudence with consistency among most states have yet to
unfold; the bench and bar are just discovering the change. This comment
explores how this occurred and what the potential consequences are and also
recommends remediation of Maryland’s statutory language to conform to the
UCC.
I.

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Maryland Uniform Commercial Code was enacted in 1963, with an
effective date of February 1, 1964.3 It later became the nine leading titles of
the Commercial Law Article, along with ten other non-uniform titles in the
recompilation and reorganization of the Annotated Code of Maryland in
1975.4 Over time, the Commercial Law Article has expanded to 23 titles in

*

Lisa D. Sparks, Esq., is the Practitioner in Residence at the University of Baltimore
School of Law, teaching a variety of courses including Commercial Law, Sales &
Leases, Construction Law, and a Master Class in Trial Lawyering. She is also Of
Counsel at the Baltimore, Maryland law firm of Wright, Constable & Skeen, LLP.
J.D., B.A., University of Baltimore.
1
H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).
2
The Uniform Law Commission is also known as the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
3
H.B. 671, 1963 Leg., Ch. 538 (Md. 1963).
4
1975 Md. Laws Ch. 49. The current sequence of MUCC titles is: Title 1: General
Provisions; Title 2: Sales; Title 2A: Leases; Title 3: Negotiable Instruments; Title 4:
Bank Deposits and Collections; Title 5: Letters of Credit; Title 6: Bulk Transfers;
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all.5 Titles 1-10 are commonly referred to as the Maryland Uniform
Commercial Code6 (“MUCC”). As is the case with most uniform codes and
comprehensive statutory schemes, Title 1 provides general provisions,
including definitions, governing the remaining titles.7 The definition of good
faith in Title 1 was then, as it remains today, “honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned.”8
As Maryland adopted the Uniform Law Commission’s additions and
revisions to various articles, additional definitions for good faith emerged.
Titles 2 and 2A, governing the sales and leases of goods, added a separate
provision for merchants: “good faith in the case of a merchant means honesty
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
in the trade.”9 This notion of commercial standards spread to Titles 3
(Negotiable Instruments) and 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections) in 1996
following Maryland’s adoption of the 1990 UCC revisions, but covered all
parties involved as opposed to just merchants.10 Official comment 4 to UCC
section 3-103 explained the significance and intent surrounding the use of
this expanded, two-part definition in the title governing negotiable
instruments:
Subsection (a)(4) introduces a definition of good faith to
apply to Titles 3 and 4. Former Titles 3 and 4 used the
definition in Section 1-201(19). The definition in
Subsection (a)(4) is consistent with the definitions of
good faith applicable to Title 2, 2A, 4, and 4A. The
definition requires not only honesty in fact, but also
“observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing.”11

Title 7: Documents of Title; Title 8: Investment Securities; and Title 9: Secured
Transactions.
5
Title 10 is an administrative title, Effective Date and Repealer, for amending Titles
1-9. Titles 11-23 cover a wide range of additional commercial matters, including
trade regulation, credit, consumer protection, regulation of certain industries, debt
collection, and certain electronic transactions.
6
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-101(a) (2013).
7
The UCC designates its numbered components as articles. Because the Annotated
Code of Maryland is already divided into subject matter articles, the MUCC is
broken down into titles. The numbering, however, is nearly identical and the labels
“article” and “title” are often used interchangeably in Maryland case law.
8
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-201(b)(20) (2013); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §
1-201(19) (2002 Repl. Vol.); MD. CODE, Art. 95B, § 1-201(19) (1957).
9
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 2-103(1)(b), 2A-103(3) (2002 Repl. Vol.).
10
1996 Md. Laws Ch. 91.
11
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 3-103, cmt. 4 (2002 Repl. Vol.).
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Title 4’s definition section was revised to simply relate back to the expanded
definition in Title 3 so that the good faith considerations for negotiable
instruments and check collection processes were consistent.12 Title 4A,
regarding wire funds transfers, used the same language as Title 3.13 Title 8,
governing investment securities, also picked up the two-pronged definition of
good faith.14
In a provision of far narrower applicability, section 7-404 provides
immunity for bailees who deliver or dispose of goods in accordance with a
document of title so long as they acted “in good faith including observance of
reasonable commercial standards.”15 According to this section’s official
comment, “[t]he generalized test of good faith and observance of reasonable
commercial standards is substituted for the attempt to particularize what
constitutes good faith in the . . . old uniform acts.”16
The net effect of these scattered provisions was that all transactions
governed by the MUCC were conducted under a general obligation of
subjective good faith.17 For particular parties and transactions, an objective
standard was overlaid, applying a rule-based measure of compliance.18 It is
important to note that Maryland law does not recognize an independent cause
of action for breach of the duty of good faith in the MUCC or otherwise. 19
Instead, the prescribed duty of good faith applies in the context of the
performance or enforcement of an obligation arising under the MUCC.20
A.

MARYLAND’S 2012 LEGISLATION

In 2012, the Maryland General Assembly unanimously adopted various
revisions to the MUCC. Many of the amendments were a belated adoption
of the Uniform Law Commission’s 2001 revisions to Article 1.21 House Bill
700 titled “Commercial Law – Uniform Commercial Code – Revisions to
Title 1” stated this purpose:

12

Id. at § 4-104(c).
Id. at § 4A-105(a)(5) cmt. 3.
14
Id. at § 8-102(a)(10).
15
Id. at § 7-404.
16
Id.
17
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-203 (“Every contract or duty within Titles 1-10 of
this article imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enhancement.”).
This provision has been stylistically edited and moved to § 1-304.
18
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 2-103(1)(b), 2A-103(3), 3-103(a)(4), 4-104(c),
4A-105, 7-404, 8-102 (2002 Repl. Vol.).
19
See Howard Oaks, Inc. v. Md. Nat’l Bank, 810 F. Supp. 674, 677 (D. Md. 1993).
20
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-304 cmt. 1 (2002 Repl. Vol.).
21
See U.C.C §§ 1-101 – 1-310 (2001).
13
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[R]evising, updating, reorganizing, and clarifying Title 1
of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code (MUCC)
relating to general provisions applicable to the MUCC;
establishing a certain short title; clarifying the
transactions to which Title 1 of the MUCC applies; . . .
making certain stylistic changes; defining certain terms;
altering and repealing certain definitions; making
conforming changes to certain provisions of the MUCC;
and generally relating to the Maryland Uniform
Commercial Code.22
House Bill 700’s reach went far beyond Title 1, however, amending sections
of Titles 1, 2, 2A, 3, 4, 4A, 5, 8, and 9.23
In its original form, as proposed and first read in the House Economic
Matters Committee on February 8, 2012, House Bill 700 included this Title
1, § 1-201 definition: “(20) ‘Good faith’, except as otherwise provided in
Title 5 of this article, means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.”24 This revision, bringing an objective
component to the general definition governing all titles, save Title 5 by
express exclusion, rendered the corresponding definitions scattered
throughout the MUCC redundant and unnecessary. Sections 2-103(1)(b), 3103(a)(4), 4A-105(a)(6), and 8-102(a)(10) were deleted in their entirety and
marked with “Reserved” placeholders.25 Sections 2A-103(3) and 4-104(c)
were similarly deleted by virtue of their aforementioned reference sections
being deleted. House Bill 700, as originally drafted, tracked the Uniform
Law Commission’s 2001 revisions to Article 1.26
22

H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012); see also 2012 Md. Laws Ch. 673
(the stated purpose remained the same from proposal through enactment).
23
H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (repealing, reenacting, and amending
§§ 1-101 – 1208, 2-103, 2-202, 2A-103, 2A-501, 2A-518, 2A-519, 2A-527, 2A-528,
3-103, 4-104, 4A-105, 4A-106, 4A-204, 5-103, 8-102, 9-102).
24
Id.
25
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 2-103(1)(b), 3-103(a)(4), 4A-105(a)(6), 8102(a)(10) (2013).
26
The Uniform Law Commission’s Reporter’s Notes elaborate on the rationale for
consolidating the definition of good faith in Article 1. “Reasons for change. Current
UCC section 1-201(19) defines ‘good faith’ simply as honesty in fact; the definition
contains no element of commercial reasonableness. Initially, that definition applied
throughout the Code with only one exception. UCC section 2-103(1)(b) provided
that ‘in this Article’ ‘good faith in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.’ This
alternative definition was limited in applicability . . . Over time, however,
amendments to the UCC brought the Article 2 concept of good faith (subjective
honesty and objective reasonableness) into other Articles. First, Article 2A explicitly
incorporated the Article 2 standard. See U.C.C. section 2A-103(7). Then, other
Articles broadened the applicability of that standard by adopting it for all parties
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The Revised Fiscal Policy Note attached to House Bill 700 demonstrates a
fundamental misunderstanding of the multiple definitions of good faith,
which existed throughout the MUCC prior to the 2012 revisions.27 In the
“analysis” portion of the report, a bill summary provides that “[t]he bill alters
the definition of good faith to mean honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned.”28 In the “current law” segment, the report cites that
“‘Good faith’ is defined as honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned.”29 There is no alteration in that language. Furthermore, no
mention is made of the deletion of other sections and definitions of good
faith.
Two letters of support, or written testimony, were received by the
Economic Matters Committee. Both supporters were responding to the
version of House Bill 700 that expanded the definition of good faith to
include an objective standard in order to promote fairness and consistency.
One letter from the Maryland Commission on Uniform State Laws urged the
adoption of the updates presented in House Bill 700 (as well as House Bill
713, affecting Title 9 only30) to make the MUCC “consistent with the most
recent revisions of the UCC Articles 1 and 9[,]” especially where the Article
1 updates “have already been enacted by all but a handful of states.”31 The
testimony makes clear that the Maryland Commission on Uniform State
Laws was in favor of the inclusion of an objective standard in the Title 1
definition of good faith, citing that provision specifically and in detail:
“Revised Definition of Good Faith – Reasonable commercial standards are
added to definition of ‘good faith’, providing an objective and fairer standard
for courts to enforce to obligations and duties set forth in the various articles
of the UCC.”32
A second letter supporting adoption was submitted by the Uniform
Commercial Code Subcommittee of the Business Law Section of the

rather than just for merchants. See, e.g., U.C.C. sections 3-103(a)(4), 4A-105(a)(6),
8-102(a)(10). . . and of revised sections 2-102(a)(24) (Sept. 1996 draft) and 9105(a)(18) (Annual Meeting draft). All of these definitions are comprised of two
elements - honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing. . .. Given this near unanimity, it is appropriate to move the definition of
‘good faith’ to Article 1.” U.C.C. § 1-201 reporter’s notes.
27
H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (Revised Fiscal and Policy Note).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
H.B. 713, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).
31
Letter from Steven N. Leitess, Comm’r, Md. Comm’n on Unif. State Laws, to Del.
Brian Feldman, Md. H.D. (Feb. 17, 2012) (on file with the Md. Dep’t of Legislative
Servs.).
32
Id.
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Maryland State Bar Association.33 This group also pressed for consistency
with updates to the UCC.34 This letter’s summary of the addition of
reasonable commercial standards to the Title 1 good faith definition was
identical to the one in the first letter.35 The author of this letter appeared
before the committee hearing on February 21, 2012. It is unclear whether he
gave testimony, but he did indicate that he was in favor of the legislation.
The only other witness who registered at the February 21, 2012 hearing
before the Economic Matters Committee was a representative of the
Maryland Bankers Association,36 who indicated by checking a box that his
testimony was favorable with amendments.37 An amendment was indeed
introduced at some point during this committee hearing.38 The amendment
struck the objective, reasonable commercial standards language in the Title 1
good faith definition, essentially reverting back to honesty in fact.39 This
amendment did not maintain the status quo, because no effort was made to
restore the existing two-part definitions of good faith in Titles 2, 2A, 3, 4,
4A, and 8.40 With this single amendment, which was passed by the House of
Delegates following a second reading on March 17, 2012, the net effect of
House Bill 700 was to strip away the objective standard of good faith in the
MUCC.41 The annotations do not contain legislative history notes to explain
the purpose or intent of this revision. Moreover, the published comments in
the annotations are in line with the UCC and do not explain Maryland’s
departure from the uniform language.42

33

Letter from K. Lee Riley, Jr., Chair, Unif. Commercial Code Subcomm., Bus. Law
Section, Md. State Bar Ass’n, to Del. Brian Feldman, Md. H.D. (Feb. 21, 2012) (on
file with the Md. Dep’t. of Legislative Servs.).
34
Id.
35
The inclusion of identical summaries of the proposed Title 1 good faith definition
revision by both supporters suggests that the language appeared in the original Fiscal
and Policy Note in the bill summary section. The original report is not available in
the bill file for comparison or verification.
36
The finance and banking industry is the most likely to oppose the application of an
objective standard. See Patricia L. Heatherman, Comment, Good Faith in Revised
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Any Change? Should There Be?, 29
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 567, 590 (1993).
37
Hearing on H.B. 700 Before the H. Comm. on Econ. Matters, 2012 Leg., 430th
Sess. (Md. 2012) (witness sign-up sheet).
38
ECONOMIC MATTERS COMMITTEE, AMENDMENT TO HOUSE BILL 700, H.B. 700863493-1, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).
39
Id.
40
Id. Recall that prior to House Bill 700, several titles of the MUCC contained their
own definitions of “good faith” including, in some titles, an objective component.
41
H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (codified at MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAW § 1-201(b)(20) (2013)).
42
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 1-201 cmt. 20, 3-103 cmt. 4, 7-404 cmt.
(2013).
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THE SUBJECTIVE VS. OBJECTIVE DEBATE

The distinction between a pure subjective (honesty in fact) and an
objective (compliance with some standard(s)) methodology for good faith
determinations is more than just semantics and represents a substantive
divergence in applicable law - leading to different outcomes. The debate
between these two competing options is not, however, new. Courts have
grappled with how best to judge a party’s conduct on a continuum as long as
commercial cases have been litigated.43 Indeed, both tests date back to early
nineteenth century English cases.44 In recent history, the 1990 UCC
revisions expanding the definition of good faith in Article 3 sparked a
broader conversation in the context of negotiable instruments and good
faith’s role in the requirements for a holder in due course.45
The purely subjective approach, i.e., honesty in fact, translates roughly to
a proscription on intentional misrepresentation. Others have characterized
this as the “pure heart and empty head” or even “innocent simpleton” test.46
At one time, the subjective test was considered the majority rule because of
its applicability across the entire UCC and because some states had declined
to adopt the 1990 revisions to Article 3 that borrowed an objective prong
from Article 2’s heightened obligations for merchants.47
The objective standard, which is always coupled with the subjective
standard, is reminiscent of negligence, in that, it introduces a test of
reasonableness.48 Moreover, the benchmark of “commercial standards” is
flexible to meet the spectrum of parties and transactions to which it is

43

See, e.g., Price v. Neal, (1762) 97 Eng. Rep. 871, 873 (K.B.); 3 Burrow. 1354,
1356-7 (“He denied it to be a payment by mistake: and insisted that it was rather
owing to the negligence of the plaintiff; who should have inquired and satisfied
himself ‘whether the bill was really drawn upon him by Sutton, or not.’ Here is no
fraud in the defendant; who is stated ‘to have acted innocently and bona fide, without
the least privity or suspicion of the forgery; and to have paid the whole value for the
bills.’ . . . Here was no fraud: no wrong. It was incumbent upon the plaintiff, to be
satisfied ‘that the bill drawn upon him was the drawer's hand,’ before he accepted or
paid it: but it was not incumbent upon the defendant, to inquire into it”); see also
State Sec. Check Cashing, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 409 Md. 81, 93-94, 972
A.2d 882, 889-890 (2009) (examining the obligations of a check cashing facility
who later asserts holder in due course status).
44
Gill v. Cubitt, (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B.) (objective standard); Lawson v.
Weston, (1801) 170 Eng. Rep. 640, 641 (subjective standard).
45
See generally Heatherman, supra note 37, at 569 (discussing the expansion of
good faith in Article 3 of UCC); see also U.C.C. §3-103(a)(4) (1990).
46
Heatherman, supra note 37, at 569.
47
Id. at 590.
48
Id. at 584.
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intended to apply, much like a tort duty.49 The drafters of the UCC took care,
however, to reject the notion that they intended for a negligence standard to
apply:
Although fair dealing is a broad term that must be
defined in context, it is clear that it is concerned with the
fairness of conduct rather than the care with which an act
is performed. Failure to exercise ordinary care in
conducting a transaction is an entirely different concept
than failure to deal fairly in conducting the transaction.
Both fair dealing and ordinary care, . . . are to be judged
in the light of reasonable commercial standards, but
those standards in each case are directed to different
aspects of commercial conduct.50
The goal of a combined subjective-objective standard of good faith is to
balance the protection of innocent parties with the temptation to be willfully
ignorant. In specifying commercial standards, which are only reasonable, the
UCC drafters have artfully avoided creating too high a standard that reflects
best practices or the most possible fairness. Moderating the test with
reasonableness also allows adjustment to the relevant parties and their
respective levels of sophistication.
III.

RAMIFICATIONS OF THE CURRENT LAW

Maryland is now one of only a few states without the two-pronged
subjective-objective definition of good faith in its enactment of UCC Article
1.51 This undermines the essential purpose of uniform laws, which is to
establish as much consistency among states as possible. This is especially
important for commercial law matters which often stretch across state
borders and may invoke the laws of multiple jurisdictions within the same
dispute. Contract drafters, including lenders and merchant sellers who tend
to require their own forms and terms, may be enticed to insert choice of law

49

Id. at 585; see also U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990) (adding a definition for ordinary
care for those engaged in business: “observance of reasonable commercial standards,
prevailing in the area in which the person is located with respect to which the person
is engaged . . .”).
50
U.C.C. § 3-103 cmt 4 (2002); see also State Sec. Check Cashing, Inc., 409 Md. at
95, 976 A.2d at 890 (instructing that reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
are about fairness and not negligence).
51
Missouri has yet to adopt any of the 2001 revisions to UCC Article 1. A few
additional states have enacted non-uniform provisions. For example, Florida has
maintained subjective good faith for non-merchants in Article 2A only. See FLA.
STAT. §§ 672.103(1)(b), 680.1031(1)(a) (2010).
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provisions utilizing Maryland law, which holds them to the lowest standards.
Forum shopping is also a possibility.
The inconsistencies between certain MUCC provisions and the
explanatory annotations will cause confusion among judges and practitioners
attempting to utilize, argue, and enforce these provisions.52 Of most concern
is the lengthy comment about the expansion of the definition of good faith
following section 1-201.53 While the text remains just “honesty in fact,” the
comment erroneously explains, in part:
Thus, the definition of “good faith” in this section
merely confirms what has been the case for a number of
years as Articles of the UCC have been amended or
revised – the obligation of “good faith,” applicable in
each Article, is to be interpreted in the context of all
Articles except for Article 5 as including both the
subjective element of honesty in fact and the objective
element of the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing. As a result, both the
subjective and objective elements are part of the
standard of “good faith,” whether that obligation is
specifically referenced in another Article of the Code
(other than Article 5) or is provided by this Article.54
Additionally, upon reliance on a revised Title 1 definition, section 7-404 was
revised to remove the expanded subjective-objective description of good
faith.55 The official comment now inexplicably reads, “This section uses the
test of good faith, as defined in Section 1-201, to continue the policy of
former 7-404. Good faith now means ‘honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.’”56 Thus, the policy of
section 7-404 has been changed without an accurate explanation or rationale.
Only a handful of published cases have addressed MUCC issues and
mentioned good faith since the revisions went into effect on June 1, 2012.57
None have hinged on a determination of good faith for their outcomes. Over
time, however, good faith issues will be litigated and courts will be left
without the benefit of precedent to guide their analysis of good faith issues,

52

See supra note 44.
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-201 cmt. 20 (2013).
54
Id. (emphasis added).
55
Id. at § 7-404 cmt. (2013).
56
Id.
57
See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Nextday Network Hardware Corp., 73 F. Supp.3d 636
(D. Md. 2014); Thompkins v. Mountaineer Inv., LLC, 439 Md. 118, 94 A.3d 61
(2014).
53
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likely leading to inconsistent outcomes and a tangled web of confused case
law.
An anticipated area where this change in definition, and therefore
standards of conduct, will have some impact is the establishment of holder in
due course status. The exercise of good faith is a key requirement for holder
in due course status.58 In the current market, banks and check cashing
facilities are the most likely players to assert holder in due course status as to
instruments because few people negotiate promissory notes and checks
otherwise. Under the prior good faith definition in MUCC section 3-103,
which required, in addition to honesty in fact, “observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing,” these institutions were expected to act
and inquire according to what a reasonable party in their position would do.59
Now, banks and check cashing institutions are treated the same as consumers
and other unsophisticated parties, held to no higher expectations of fairness
notwithstanding their superior knowledge, skill and access to information.60
This regression of banks’ obligations is further illustrated in the context of
shifting losses where there has been negligence under MUCC section 3406.61 In practice, that rule precludes a negligent customer from asserting an
alteration or forgery against his bank to obtain a re-credit, but only if the
bank paid the instrument, took it for value or took it for collection in good
faith. If the bank does not exercise good faith, it cannot enforce the
preclusion.62 Where good faith is as simple as “honesty in fact,”
unfortunately, the bank will almost always be found to have exercised it.

58

MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 3-302(a)(2)(ii) (2013).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §3-103 (2002 Repl. Vol.).
60
See In re Nieves, 648 F.3d 232, 239-240 (4th Cir. 2011) (“We therefore arrive at
the conclusion that the objective good-faith standard probes what the transferee
knew or should have known, taking into consideration the customary practices of the
industry in which the transferee operates” (internal citation omitted)).
61
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 3-406(a) (2013).
62
Id.
59

